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Tax expenditureBusiness structure§199A

Qualified business income deduction (§199A)

Owners of pass-through businesses deduct 20% of that income before tax.

Estimated annual cost
$75.5B
$75,500,000,000 · FY2025
1.1% of all federal spending in FY2025Total outlays $7.0T · Treasury, Monthly Treasury Statement, receipts, outlays and deficit/surplus
8 months ago

JCT line: "Deduction for qualified business income".

By total cost
#7
Most cost, least good
#5
Most good, least cost
#11
Benefit concentration
Spread outConcentrated
84/ 100, concentrated

The deduction is proportional to pass-through income, which is heavily concentrated among a small share of owners. The wage and capital limitations further favour larger operations over small ones.

JCT distributional analysis; Treasury Office of Tax Analysis unverified

Structural reading

The most legible recent example of the core loop, because the timeline is short enough to see whole. A corporate rate cut created a gap between corporate and pass-through taxation; organised pass-through interests argued the gap was unfair; the resulting deduction is proportional to income and therefore delivers most of its value to the largest operators. The wage-and-property limitation, added to prevent the deduction from becoming a pure labour-income shelter, has the side effect of favouring capital-intensive entities over the small service businesses most often invoked in its defence. The provision was enacted in 2017 with a sunset and made permanent in 2025, which completes the loop this site is built to show: a temporary preference, an organised beneficiary class, and an expiry date that arrived and was removed.

Who gets it

The channels the benefit actually flows through, described by asset position, entity form and form of return. Never by named individuals.

$63.4B84%
to a narrow class
$12.1B16%
spread broadly

Cost split by the concentration score. That score is a judgement rather than a published figure, so treat this as the scale of the split, not an audited allocation.

  • Owners of large pass-through entities

    Because the deduction is a fixed percentage of qualified income, its value scales linearly with the size of the ownership stake.

  • Businesses structured to satisfy the wage and property tests

    The limitations reward entities with substantial W-2 payroll or depreciable property, favouring capital-intensive operations over small service businesses.

  • Income recharacterised from wage to distribution

    The deduction creates a standing incentive to structure compensation as owner distribution rather than salary, a margin unavailable to employees.

Who pays

Wage earners and taxpayers generally. Employees performing identical work as W-2 staff receive no equivalent deduction.

Sector lobbying, all issues combined
$112M2024Recentunverified

Sector aggregate.

This transfer follows a general pattern, asymmetric organisation, sustained expert attention, and scheduled expiry dates.

How rent-seeking works →

Legislative history and accountability

Enacting statutes, major amendments, recorded votes with party breakdown, and live reform proposals.

Enabling legislation

Major amendment

  • One Big Beautiful Bill ActP.L. 119-21Jul 4, 2025

    Removed the sunset from §199A(i), making the deduction permanent at the unchanged 20% rate, and widened the phase-in range for specified service businesses from 2026. Enacted through budget reconciliation.

    Party-line (Republican)

    Enacted through budget reconciliation, the procedure that allows passage without minority-party votes. No separate roll call on this provision is recorded here.

Reform proposal

  • Proposals to limit or phase out the deduction above a thresholdlive

    Proposals in recent Congresses would cap the deduction or phase it out at higher income levels. With the sunset now removed, repeal or limitation requires affirmative legislation rather than mere inaction.

Lobbying around this provision

$112Mreported by the small business and real estate coalitions in 2024

This is not campaign money, and it is not attributable to the votes above. Lobbying disclosures record what organisations spent engaging policymakers across an entire issue area over a quarter. They are not broken out by party, by member, or by bill, and no part of this figure can be traced to any vote on this page. It is shown as an indicator of how organised the interest around this provision is, nothing more.

Demonstrating an actual relationship between money and votes would require campaign contribution records matched to each member of the roll call. That is a different dataset and is not yet built here.

Senate LDA filings, search disclosures by filer and issue

Sources and data freshness

Concentration basisJCT distributional analysis; Treasury Office of Tax Analysis unverified
LobbyingSenate LDA filings, small business and real estate coalitions published Jan 22, 2025unverified

Published within the last year. Figures marked unverified are seed estimates that have not been reconciled line-by-line against the primary source document. See the methodology for how each score is constructed.